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In Federal Government procurement there is a wide variety
of contract types available to provide flexibility to the
Government and contractors in providing goods and services.
Contract types vary according to the degree of risk assumed by
the contractor and the amount of profit offered for achieving
or exceeding specified goals or standards.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) groups contract
types into two broad categories: fixed price and cost-
reimbursement contracts . On one end of the spectrum is the
firm- fixed-price contract, in which the contractor has
responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit
or loss. On the other end of the spectrum is the cost -plus
-
fixed- fee contract in which the contractor has minimal risk
for cost and the negotiated fee or profit is fixed. In
between are the various contracts in which the contractor's
risk for cost and the profit or fee offered are tailored to
the uncertainties involved in contract performance. [Ref . l:p.
16.101]
The use of the award fee contract is an unique incentive
structure that provides the Government a method of subjective,
after the fact evaluation of contractor performance and
affords the Government additional flexibility to reward and
motivate the contractor for above average performance.
Cost-plus-award- fee and fixed-price-award- fee contracts
have many applications at the Field Contracting Activity
Level. Award fee contracts have many benefits and costs not
associated with other types of incentive contracts. To better
facilitate its use, barriers that are preventing more
applications at the field level need to be recognized. Then
it will be possible to identify what can be done to overcome
these barriers.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the research are:
(1) Determine the uses of award fee contracts at the Navy
Field Activity level (Navy Regional Contracting Centers)
.
(2) Identify the factors that the contracting officer
considers when selecting contract type and what factors
influence the use of award fee contracts.
(3) Develop a model that can aid a contracting officer in
determining the optimal award fee pool amount.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on these objectives, the primary research question
is: What are the key elements and barriers in using award fee
contracts at the Navy Field Contracting Activity level and how
can these barriers be overcome to facilitate the proper use of
award fee contracts?
Secondary research questions include:
(1) What is the award fee contract concept?
(2) What are the uses of cost-plus-award- fee (CPAF) and
fixed-price-award- fee (FPAF) contracts?
(3) When should an award fee contract be used?
(4) What are the barriers to using award fee contracts?
(5) How might the impediments or barriers be reduced or
eliminated?
D. SCOPE
This thesis will focus on the identifying and resolving
barriers to using award fee contracts at the field contracting
level. The analysis will also explain when it is appropriate
to use cost-plus-award- fee and fixed-price-award- fee
contracts. A secondary goal is to determine if an economic
model can be used to determine the optimal award fee pool for
an award fee contract.
E.
METHODOLOGY
To answer the primary and secondary research questions two
techniques will be employed. First, the thesis will include
a comprehensive search of available literature dealing with
incentive and award fee contracting, cost-plus-award- fee and
fixed-price-award- fee contracts, contractor motivation and
field level contracting. Second, research data is collected
in the form of personal and phone interviews and survey
questionnaires with acquisition personnel from the Government.
F. LIMITATIONS
A potential limitation is the lack of specific data on
using award fee contracts at the field contracting level.
Cost-plus-award- fee contracts have been successfully used on
major weapon systems. However, fixed-price-award- fee
contracts have only been used only on a limited basis. The
FPAF contract is not an officially recognized contract type in
the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
This study assumes that the reader commands a general
knowledge or basic familiarity with Federal Government
contracting language and the Federal acquisition process. It
is further assumed that the reader is aware of the
relationship that exists between industry and the Federal
Government in contracting methodology.
H. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT
The research is organized in the following manner:
Chapter I contains the introduction and research questions to
be analyzed. Chapter II contains relevant background
information on award fee contracting history, the award fee
concept, and Department of Defense (DOD) contract types.
Chapter III outlines the cost-plus-award- fee contract and its
uses. Chapter IV outlines the fixed-price-award- fee contract
and its uses. Chapter V contains the elements of an award fee
plan. Chapter VI applies an economic model to determine an
optimal award fee amount. Chapter VII provides conclusions
derived from the research and recommendations on use of award
fee contracts at Navy Regional Contracting Centers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ORIGINS
The award fee contract dates back to the late 1950s and
early 1960s. The National Aeronautical Space Administration
(NASA) and the U.S. Navy incorporated subjective, award- like
features into traditional fixed fee and incentive fee
structures, mainly in the area of support services. This
developed at that time into a new contract type: the cost-
plus -award- fee contract.
Although commonly used by NASA in the 1960s, most people
credit Frederic M. Scherer for some of the earliest and most
important advocacy of the cost -plus -award- fee contract type.
Scherer devoted a full chapter in his 19 64 book, The Weapons
Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives, to "After-the-fact
Evaluation; A New Incentive Approach." The proposals he
stated are very similar to modern award fee concepts. He
envisioned retrospective evaluation of contractor performance
by knowledgeable personnel, a central organization of six to
ten such personnel, called a Performance Evaluation Board.
This board would use a variety of evaluation factors for each
assessment and the contractor would be rewarded by high profit
or sales. [Ref. 2:p. 11]
Up until this time, NASA and DOD mainly used award fee
contracting for support services. Scherer advocated it could
best be applied in research and development applications. The
award fee approach would be better suited to the uncertainty
of these projects and eliminate the problems associated with
fixed-price or predetermined incentive fee contracts. [Ref.
2:p. 14]
Interest in award fee contracting emerged and grew in the
1960 's with enthusiasm for developing objective weighted
formulas for determining contractor profit in incentive type
contracts. The goal of award fee contracting was the same as
other types of incentive contracts, a desire to motivate
contractors by associating the fee or profit with actual
contractor's performance. The award fee process recognized
the uncertainty in setting firm incentive targets in advance
before observing actual performance and the dynamic changes
that can occur in these applications. The award- fee process
better recognized the uncertainty for change. [Ref. 2:p. 14]
B. THE AWARD FEE CONCEPT
Incentive contracts emerged in DOD in the early 1960 's to
curb the size and frequency of cost overruns on cost-plus
contracts. Ideally, firm- fixed price contracts would be used.
However, given the complex nature emerging in research and
development contracting, alternative contract types were
tried. The most common alternative was the cost-plus- fixed-
fee (CPFF) approach, but this type of contract lacks any
incentive for a contractor to control costs. Fixed-price
incentive (FPI) and cost-plus- incentive- fee (CPIF) contracts
were then used to relate the contractor's profit to his
ability to reduce or control costs on a predetermined share
formula.
Traditionally, the award fee contract has been grouped in
the FAR in the section on incentive contracts. Similarities
do exist because both are bonus type contracts. Unlike CPIF
or FPI contracts, the CPAF arrangement does not include
automatic fee adjustment or predetermined targets. The CPAF
incentive motivates a contractor to strive for continuously
excellent performance in areas of contracting effort or
activity. "Success is rewarded because it is earned." [Ref.
3:p. 21A1]
Cost savings have been attributed to incentive contracts
(FPI and CPIF) because cost overruns are much smaller and less
frequent than under cost-plus contracts. However, the amount
of fee or profit is based on a negotiated target cost. Thus,
the contractor's real incentive may be to raise or inflate
their estimated costs. [Ref. 4:p. 89]
In award fee contracting, profit or fee is based on actual
contractor performance, between contract award and completion.
A contractor will have less incentive to overestimate costs
since no rigid profit formula is applied to actual costs.
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Raymond B. Hunt [Ref. 5: pp. 589-590] best summarizes the
award fee approach in what he describes as the Twelve Award
Fee Hallmarks:
(1) Award fee contracting recognizes that in a mixed
sector, quasi-market with important technical
uncertainties, a high degree of cooperation between
contractor and contracting agency is essential to program
success.
(2) By making them ongoing, fee- relevant evaluators of
contractor performance, it assures an influential role for
government managers in the program.
(3) It recognizes that, because of limitations on time,
skill, and information, top managers can formulate plans
but, except in unusual cases, rarely can exert detailed
control over operations.
(4) Therefore, it helps build strong lateral relationships
by stimulating formal and informal communications across
organizational levels and boundaries, especially as
between contractor and government program managers
.
(5) It recognizes that the contractors' motivations (like
the government) are varied.
(6) It leaves to the contractors' own management the task
of "motivating" their employees and helps needless
"micromanagerial" meddling by government personnel.
(7) Award fee contracting implicitly recognizes
Sharkansky's well taken point that "the quality and
efficiency of contracting are not attributes that come
automatically." Management of it is essential. System
acquisition is a dynamic affair. It presents a changing
variety of problems that must be dealt with continuously
by human mangers. No specifically contractual or
management system panaceas exist for it, and "hands -off"
ways of doing it do not work.
(8) Unlike automatic incentive contracts, award fee
contracts avoid rigid, mechanical, predetermined
contractual formulas for fee and other decisions in favor
of flexibility and active human judgement.
(9) Award fee contracting is hospitable to a wide variety
of ad hoc qualitative or quantitative operational-
managerial innovations for coping with ill -defined tasks,
subject mainly to "workability" standards.
(10) It can simplify contractual provisions as a means of
decreasing administrative complexity and burdensome
routines
.
(11) It allows for easy periodic change of contracting
targets and priorities and of (sic) means of evaluating
their achievement
.
(12) It helps assure that contractor profits are earned by
providing for variable fees to be paid after-the-fact on
the basis of performance.
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACT TYPES
Contract types serve as a written agreement to the price
the Government is to pay a contractor for delivering goods or
performing services. The contract types vary according to the
risk assumed by the contractor in achieving specified goals or
standards. The contract types authorized by the FAR are
categorized either as fixed-price or cost -reimbursement
contracts
.
1. Fixed- Price Contracts
Fixed-price arrangements provide for the contractor
to perform services or deliver a product in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the contract. It is an agreement
by the Government to pay a firm price specified in the
contract, or an adjustable price in appropriate cases. Fixed-
price contracts that include provisions for adjusting
tentative prices contain a specified ceiling price or target
price (including target cost). [Ref. l:p. 16.201]
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a. Firm-Fixed-Price Contract
A firm- fixed-price (FFP) contract is an agreement
by the Government to pay the contractor a price that is not
subject to any adjustment. The contractor bears full
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.
This gives maximum incentive to control costs and perform
effectively. This also imposes minimum administration by the
contracting activity since auditing of costs is not required
[Ref . 6:p. 281]
.
b. Fixed-Price Contract With Economic Price
Adjustment
A fixed-price contract with economic price
adjustment clauses is used to protect the Government or
contractor against significant fluctuations in labor or
material costs or changes in the contractor's established
prices. The contract clauses provide for an upward or
downward revision of the stated contract price if specified
contingencies occur. The three general Economic price
adjustments are:
(1) Adjustments based on established prices.
(2) Adjustments based on actual costs of labor or
material
.
(3) Adjustments based on cost indices of labor or
material. [Ref l:p. 16.203-1]
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These clauses provide for either Government price increases or
decreases. If provisions for price adjustment were not used,
a contractor might quote excessive contingency allowances to
minimize his (or her) risk due to economic uncertainties.
[Ref. 7:p. 1-21]
c. Fixed-Price Contracts with Prospective Price
Redetermina tion
A fixed-price contract with' prospective price
redetermination provides for:
(a) a firm- fixed price for an initial period of contract
deliveries or performance and (b) prospective
redetermination, . . . , of the price for subsequent periods
of performance [Ref. l:p. 16.205-1].
This contract is used when the amount of labor or material is
unknown, but will become known with limited production
experience. The buyer believes the initial fixed-price is too
high and will be lowered after reviewing the incurred costs.
d. Fixed-Ceiling-Price Contract with Retroactive
Price Redetermination
The fixed- ceiling-price contract with retroactive
price redetermination provides for adjusting the contract
price after performance. A fixed ceiling price is negotiated
initially that reflects a reasonable risk sharing by the
contractor. Actual audited contract costs are used as -he
starting point for the price revision [Ref. 7:p. 1-27] . This
contract provides the contractor no cost control incentive
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except for the ceiling price. The FAR limits the use of this
arrangement to research and development contracts estimated at
$100,000 or less and when a firm- fixed price can not be
negotiated at the outset because of the low dollar value and
short performance period [Ref. l:p. 16.206-27],
e. Firm-Fixed-Price, Level-Of-Effort Term Contract
This type of contract is suitable for research and
development when the work can not be clearly defined in
advance, but the level of effort required to accomplish it can
be agreed upon by the Government and the contractor. The
Government will pay the contractor a specified amount and the
contractor is obligated to provide a specified level of effort
over a stated time. The payment is based on the effort
expended rather than results achieved. [Ref. l:p. 16.207.2]
f. Fixed-Price -Award-Fee Contract
A fixed-price-award- fee (FPAF) contract is a fixed-
price contract that includes an award fee. The award fee
represents an additional pool of funds available to the
contractor after a unilateral subjective Government
evaluation. The award fee pool should be sufficient to
motivate the contractor to perform above a minimum acceptable
level. [Ref. 8:p. 43]
g. Fixed-Price Incentive (Firm Target) Contract
This type of contract provides for a target price,
a ceiling price and a variable profit formula. A firm pricing
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arrangement is negotiated at the outset of the contract to
provide a basis for negotiating the final price.
When the contract is completed, the contractor
submits a statement of costs incurred in performing the
contract. These are audited to determine allocability and
allowability. They are used as a reference for negotiating
the final cost with the contractor. The final price is
established by applying the firm pricing arrangement
negotiated at the commencement of the contract. A final cost
greater than the target cost results in a final profit less
than the target profit. If final cost is less than target
cost, the final profit is greater than target profit. If
final negotiated cost exceeds the price ceiling, the
contractor absorbs the difference as a loss. [Ref. l:p.
16.403-1]
h. Fixed-Price Incentive (Successive Targets)
Contract
This contract specifies an initial target cost,
initial target profit, initial profit adjustment formula, a
ceiling price and a production point for negotiating the firm
target cost and firm target profit. These elements are
negotiated prior to the contract. After reaching the
specified production point (usually before delivery of the
first item) , the Government and the contractor may:
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(1) Negotiate a firm fixed price using the firm target cost
plus the firm target profit as a guide or
(2) If negotiation of firm fixed price is inappropriate,
they may negotiate a formula for establishing the final
price using the firm target cost and firm target profit.
The final cost is then negotiated at completion as under the
fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract. [Ref l:p.
16.403-2]
2. Cost -Reimbursement Contracts
In contrast, cost -reimbursement contracts differ from
fixed-price contracts in that they provide for the Government
to reimburse the contractor for allowable incurred costs,
subject to certain restrictions. The Government and the
contractor agree to an estimate of the total cost for the
purpose of establishing a ceiling that the contractor may not
exceed.
The contractor agrees to use best efforts to complete
the contract requirements within the estimate. The contractor
notifies the Government if they expect to exceed the estimate
and submit a revised estimate to complete the stated contract
performance. The contractor is not required to continue
performance beyond the established estimate unless approved by
the contracting officer and the estimate has been increased.
[Ref. 7:p. 1-11]
a. Cost Contract
A cost contract is a cost -reimbursement contract in
which the Government reimburses the contractor for all
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allowable incurred costs but pays no fee or profit. Because
of this no- fee provision its use is appropriate for research
and development contracts with non-profit or educational
institutions. [Ref. l:p. 16.303]
b. Cost -Sharing Contract
In a cost -sharing (CS) contract, the Government
reimburses the contractor only for an agreed upon portion of
its allowable costs. In addition, the contractor receives no
fee. Most cost sharing arrangements are used for procuring
basic and applied research when the contractor agrees to
absorb a portion of the cost in the expectation of substantial
compensating benefits. Such benefits might include improving
its competitive position in the commercial marketplace or
enhancing of the contractor's capability and expertise [Ref.
7:p. 1-29] .
c. Cost -Plus -Incentive -Fee Contract
A cost-plus- incentive- fee (CPIF) contract is a
cost -reimbursement contract that negotiates an initial fee.
The fee is adjusted later by a variable profit formula that
compares total allowable costs to total target costs. The
CPIF contract functions the same as a FPIF contract except
that there is no ceiling price and the contractor is
reimbursed for all allowable costs, vice negotiated final
costs. [Ref. l:p. 16.302]
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d. Cost-Pius -Award-Fee Contract
A cost-plus-award- fee (CPAF) contract reimburses
the contractor for all allowable costs and provides a fee
consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at
inception of the contract and (b) an award amount, based on
the judgmental evaluation by the Government, sufficient to
motivate excellence in contract performance [Ref. l:p.
16.305] .
e. Cost-Pius -Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Contract
The cost-plus- fixed- fee contract is similar to
other cost -reimbursement contracts. The contractor is
reimbursed for all allowable costs. In addition, the
Government agrees to pay the contractor a fixed fee negotiated
at the inception of the contract. This fixed fee does not
vary with actual costs. This contract type presents minimum
risk to the contractor and minimum incentive to the contractor
to control costs. [Ref. l:p. 16.306]
f. Cost -Plus-Percentage of Cost Contract
This contract reimburses the seller for all
incurred costs plus a fee based upon a predetermined
percentage of incurred costs. In this contract "the higher
the cost the greater the profit." [Ref. 6:p. 285] Therefore,
it is the most undesirable of all types of contracts.
Currently under FAR section 16. 102. C, the cost-plus-a-
17
percentage-of
- cost system of contracting is prohibited for
both prime and subcontracts.
18
III. COST -PLUS -AWARD -FEE CONTRACTS
The cost -plus -award- fee contract can be primarily
described as a cost reimbursement contract that includes a fee
consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at
inception of the contract and (b) an award amount, based on
the Government's judgmental evaluation, sufficient to motivate
excellence in contract performance [Ref. l:p. 16.305].
The Federal Acquisition Regulation part 16.404-2 states
that the cost-plus-award- fee contract is suitable for use
when:
(1) The work to be performed is such that it is neither
feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective
incentive targets applicable to cost, technical
performance, or schedule;
(2) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will
be enhanced by using a contract that effectively
motivates the contractor toward exceptional performance
and provides the Government with the flexibility to
evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under
which it was achieved; and
(3) Any additional administrative effort and cost required
to monitor and evaluate performance are justified by the
expected benefits. [Ref. l:p. 16 .404- (2) (b) (1)
]
The Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation adds:
Level of effort contracts for performance of services
where mission feasibility is established but measurement
of achievement must be by subjective evaluation rather
than objective measurement [Ref. 9:p. 216 .404- (2) (b) (1) ] .
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These criteria define unique circumstances where a cost-
plus -award- fee contract is applicable.
(1) . Objective incentives unfeasible - A cost-plus-award-
fee contract should not be substituted for a cost-plus-fixed-
fee when the cost-plus-fixed-fee criteria apply, or to avoid
establishing objective targets that make the use cost-plus-
incentive- fee type contract feasible [Ref. 9:p. 216.404-
2(b) (2)]
.
(2). Enhancing likelihood of meeting acquisition
objectives by motivating contractor performance - if
acquisition objectives are certain and very objective to
measure, an alternate contract type may be more appropriate as
contractor motivation is not important. This suggests the
concept of judgmental performance evaluation. The cost - plus
-
award- fee contract requires analysis reflecting an evaluator's
opinions and impressions as to the contractor's level of
performance.
(3). Additional administrative effort and cost is
justified - cost-plus-award-fee contract carries with it
significant administrative burden in periodic monitoring,
evaluation, contractor performance reporting and determining
the award fee. These costs and burdens must be weighed
20
against expected benefits to ensure they are sufficient for a
cost-plus-award- fee contract.
The number of evaluation criteria and the requirements
they represent will differ widely among contracts. The
criteria and rating plan should motivate the contractor to
improve performance in the areas rated, but not at the expense
of at least minimum acceptable performance in all other areas
[Ref
.
l:p. 16.404- (2) (b) (2) ]
.
Cost-plus-award- fee contracts shall provide for evaluation
at stated intervals during performance, so that the
contractor will be informed of the quality of its
performance and the areas in which improvement is
expected. Partial payment of fee shall generally
correspond to the evaluation periods. This makes effective
the incentive which the award fee can create by inducing
the contractor to improve poor performance or to continue
good performance [Ref. l:p. 16 .404- (2) (b) (3 ) ]
.
As stated before the fee established in a cost -plus -award-
fee contract consists of two parts: a base fee and an award
fee. The base fee, is a fixed amount which does not vary with
performance. The base fee may range from zero to three-percent
(regulated by the FAR) of the estimated contract cost. The
base fee compensates the contractor for factors such as risk,
investment, and the nature of the work to be performed. The
base fee is generally negotiated to reflect minimum acceptable
contractor performance.
The award fee pool, in addition to the base fee, must be
sufficient to motivate the contractor to obtain excellent
performance. In accordance with the Federal Acquisition
21
Regulation, the maximum fee (award fee plus base fee) is
limited to 15% of the estimated contract cost for
experimental, developmental, or research work and to 10% for
other work [Ref . 10 :p 4] . For example if the base fee is
established at 2% for a research and development contract, the
award fee would be limited to 13%, for a total fee of 15% of
the estimated contract cost.
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IV. FIXED -PRICE -AWARD -FEE CONTRACTS
A. STRUCTURE OF FPAF CONTRACTS
The fixed-price-award- fee contract can be primarily-
described as a firm- fixed-price contract that provides an
award fee amount of additional funds available to the
contractor based on the Government's unilateral judgmental
evaluation.
Presently, the FAR only mentions award fees in discussing
cost -plus -award- fee contracts. Under the FAR, CPAF contracts
provide for a base -amount plus
an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or
part during the performance and that is sufficient to
provide motivation for excellence in such areas as
quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity and cost
effective management [Ref. l:p. 16 . 404-2 (a) ]
.
As discussed in Chapter III, CPAF contracts are restricted to
a fee narrowly defined situations.
Although the FAR does not specifically mention the
FPAF as a standard contract type, its use would seem to be
sanctioned under FAR 16.102(b). This provision permits
contracts of any type to promote the Government's interest.
A FPAF contract combines the fixed-price part of a FFP
contract with the award fee part of a CPAF contract. Using an
award fee with a fixed price contract would foster those
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attributes associated with CPAF contracts, including quality,
timeliness, ingenuity, and cost effectiveness. A FPAF
contract also avoids the usual risks associated with cost
reimbursement contracts [Ref. 11 :p. 3-9].
It should be noted that the FAR further specifies that any
contract type not described shall not be used except as a
deviation under subpart 1.4. This should not hamper using
FPAF contracts. The policy is that deviations will be granted
when necessary to meet the specific needs and requirements of
each agency. Additionally, the "development and testing of
new techniques and methods of acquisition should not be
stifled simply because such action would require a FAR
deviation" [Ref. l:p. 1.402] .
Another question that arises with respect to using award
fees concerns the sealed bid contracting method. The FAR
requires firm- fixed-price contracts or fixed price contracts
with economic price adjustments when using sealed bid
contracts [Ref. l:p. 16.102(a)]. If this means that FPAF
contracts can not be used in conjunction with sealed bidding,
this would limit the expanded use of award fees [Ref. 12 :p. 2-
10] .
It can be argued that the FAR's description of a firm-
fixed-price contract also fits a FPAF contract. The
FAR states that a FFP contract "provides for a price that is
not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's
cost experience in performing the contract." [Ref. l:p.
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16.202-1] This also holds for FPAF contracts. As with FFP
contracts, FPAF contracts are awarded on a totally objective
and quantitative basis of firm specifications and bid prices.
The factors that make price redeterminable, fixed price
incentive and cost reimbursement contracts unsuitable for
sealed bidding are not present in FPAF contracts. The award
fee has no effect on source selection. Nothing is
incompatible between sealed bidding and FPAF contracts. [Ref
12:p. 2-10]
The DFARS 216.403-70 specifically allows for using award
fee provisions in fixed price contracts. It provides for
applying award fees to motivate and reward a contractor for
management performance in areas which cannot be measured
objectively and where normal incentives cannot be used.
However, the base fee (fixed amount portion) is not used. The
DFARS further stipulates that the chief of the contracting
office must approve the use of the award fee. In addition, an
award review board and evaluation procedures must be
established. Finally, the evaluation costs shall not exceed
the expected benefit. [Ref. 9:p. 216.470]
The Government benefits from using of an award fee when it
can enhance a contractor's performance enough that overall
benefits exceed the cost of administration and the award fee.
These benefits can be nonmonetary, such as quality of
workmanship, schedule, ideas, or contractor cooperation [Ref.
ll:p. 3-9] .
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B. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
Award fees have been successfully used in Federal and DOD
contracting, but the lack of specific language concerning the
use of FPAF contracts can create confusion. A study conducted
by the Logistic Management Institute revealed a "widespread
lack of awareness" concerning the availability of FPAF
contracts. The use of award fees is generally avoided with
fixed price contracts, in part because there is no specific
authorization in the FAR [Ref. I2:p. 2-9].
A literature review in this area agreed that contracting
personnel require more control and guidance than is presently
available in the FAR. Changes were recommended to increase
the development and use of FPAF contracting. The following
changes were suggested by the Logistic Management Institute in
their research report Contracting for Quality Facilities:
- 16.208 Fixed-price-award- fee contracts.
A fixed-price-award- fee contract is a fixed price contract
that provides for an award fee based on judgmental
evaluation by the Government, sufficient to provide
motivation for excellence in contract performance. Fixed-
price-award- fee contracts are covered in Subpart 16.4,
Incentive Contracts. See 16.403 for a more complete
description and discussion of application of these
contracts
.
- 16.403-3 Fixed-price-award- fee contracts.
(a) Description. A fixed-price-award- fee contract is a
fixed-price contract that includes part of the award fee
used in cost-plus-award- fee contracts. Only the "award
amount" described in 16.404-2 is used in fixed-price-
award- fee contract. The fee is one that (1) a contractor
may earn in whole or in part during performance and (2) is
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sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such
areas as quality, timeliness, customer relations, and
technical ingenuity. The amount of the award fee to be
paid is to be determined by the Government's judgmental
evaluation of the contractor's performance in terms of the
criteria stated in the award fee portion of the contract.
This determination is made unilaterally by the Government
and is not subject to the Disputes clause.
(b) Application. (1) The fixed-price-award- fee contract is
suitable for use in circumstances similar to those for the
cost-plus-award- fee contract. The following paragraphs
also apply to fixed-price-award- fee contracts: 16.404-
2(b)(l)(ii) and (iii) and 16 . 404 -2 (b) (2) & (3). This
contract type may be used with sealed bidding or
negotiated contracting.
(c) Limitations. No fixed-price-award- fee contract shall
be awarded unless -
(1) The maximum award fee payable is not greater than 10
percent of the contract's estimated cost, excluding fee;
and
(2) The expected benefits are sufficient to warrant the
cost of the fee and any additional cost and administrative
effort this contract type may involve.
- 36.207(d) Fixed-price-award- fee contracts may be used if
the expected benefits are sufficient to warrant the cost
of the fee and any additional cost and administrative
effort the use of this contract type may involve.
C. APPLICATIONS OF FPAF CONTRACTS
As previously stated, the FAR suggests applying a CPAF
contract when (1) predetermined objective targets are
unfeasible or not effective to devise, (2) acquisition
objectives will be enhanced by motivating the contractor and
(3) the additional administrative effort is justified by the
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expected benefits. These guidelines also apply to the FPAF
contract
.
FPAF contracts have been successfully used for Base
support services, such as custodial work, lawn mowing, road
and building maintenance, pest control, trash collection, food
preparation and security [Ref. 13 :p. 10] . For these types of
contracts, a fixed-price contract is preferred for routine or
predictable services. FPAF contracts can be utilized since
the contract's statements of work can be written with
performance-oriented work descriptions. Acceptable quality
levels can be specified for measuring performance [Ref. 13 :p.
2] .
The FPAF should not be limited to service contracts. Its
flexibility allows for a wide range of applications. FPAF
hybrid contracts have been used in construction and hardware
contracts and for Government-Owned-Contractor-Operated (GOCO)
plants [Ref. 8:p. 37]. Another suggestion, the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) could use FPAF for follow- ship
contracts. Research conducted in the early 1980 's suggested
the possibility of using FPAF with economic adjustment clauses
once a cost history was firmly established in a ship Class.
The award fee would be used to encourage a contractor to
deliver a good quality ship on schedule. [Ref. 14 :p. 66]
This contract type, like other fixed price contracts, is
best utilized in an competitive environment where the contract
price is established by the product or service market. Some
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proponents assume that all fixed-price contracts could be
adapted to FPAF. This is not true. The FPAF contract is not
warranted if adequate and detailed specifications are
available, the item is available in the commercial market, or
additional emphasis on factors such as performance, management
and quality is not appropriate [Ref . 8:p. 48] . In these
situations, the Government should not have to pay extra for
services or quality that is already required or set by the
marketplace.
One area that is common in all literature reviewed is
using award fee contracts to insure or enhance quality. With
the current emphasis on Total Quality Management (TQM) and
other similar quality programs, the Government could use award
fee contracting to embrace and reinforce these programs. The
award fee facilitates communication and feedback to the
contractor and can reward performance above a minimum
acceptable standard [Ref. 15 :p. 43] . This also works well in
the fixed price environment since the amount of the award fee
does not have to be large (the maximum is 10% as allowed under
the FAR, but can be smaller) . The contractor is not only
motivated by profit but also by the grades received on
periodic performance reports.
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V. AWARD FEE PLAN
The award fee plan is designed to articulate in one
document the plan and means for assessing and evaluating
contractor performance to determine the award fee to be
rewarded [Ref. 16:p. 5]. The U.S. Army Forces Command,
Handbook for CPAF Contracts , contains the following typical
award fee plan:
(1) Base fee amount.
(2) Total award fee pool.
(3) Functional areas to be evaluated.
(4) Criteria to be used in evaluation.
(5) How performance will be measured.
(6) How performance will be graded.
(7) Relative weights to be assigned to functional areas
and the evaluation criteria.
(8) Evaluation period.
(9) Total amount of award fee pool available for each
evaluation period.
(10) The identity of the Award Fee Determining Official.
(11) Organizational structure to support evaluation of
performance.
(12) Specific methodology to be used in evaluating
performance and determining the award fee to be
paid.
(13) Contractor participation in the award fee
determination process.
(14) Payment intervals.
(15) Reporting and record keeping procedures. [Ref. 16 :p.
6]
The key areas that are important to the award fee plan are
explained below:
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A. BASE FEE AMOUNT
As stated before, the base fee can range from a minimum of
0% to a maximum of 3% of the estimated contract completion
cost. There is no consensus whether it should be set at the
minimum or maximum. However, the base fee should only cover
the minimum acceptable performance level.
B. TOTAL AWARD FEE POOL
This is the difference between the total maximum fee and
the base fee. This amount should be sufficient to motivate
the contractor to excellent performance. This is the main
mechanism for award fee contracts to motivate performance and
distinguishes them from non- incentive and other incentive
contracts. The anticipation of future award fee payments
directs the contractors attention to the areas of poor
performance.
C. FUNCTIONAL AREAS TO BE EVALUATED AND EVALUATION CRITERIA
Developing performance evaluation areas and criteria is
usually one of the first steps in award fee plans. These two
areas vary from contract to contract. In general, the
evaluation areas and criteria should fairly measure a
contractor's performance in key areas while motivating the
contractor to improve his performance where delinquent [Ref.
17 :p. 45]. The areas evaluated should be the ones that are
most important to the contracting activity and not trivial in
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nature. These elements should also be as flexible as possible
to enable the award fee plan and evaluation criteria to adapt
to changing program requirements. The Government is at an
advantage because it can make unilateral changes to the
functional areas and criteria during contract performance to
redirect the contractor's efforts as necessary.
The evaluation criteria specify the elements of the
contractor's performance that the contracting activity will
evaluate in determining the award fee amount. Thus, it is one
of the most important areas in award fee contracts; it is also
one of the most difficult in developing a quality evaluation
criteria structure.
The choice of functional areas will be tailored to each
individual contract. As stated before, performance criteria
in a award fee contract are subjective in nature. Thus,
choice of performance measures will rely on a thorough
knowledge of the managerial and technical areas of the program
[Ref . 18:p. 28]
.
To establish the functional areas and evaluation criteria,
the key elements of the program should first be chosen and
grouped into performance categories. The key elements might
include schedule, quality, technical performance, cost
control, managerial performance, business management, and
performance of work. These broad categories will be further
divided or separated into criteria for evaluating the elements
that make up each performance area. Appendix B summarizes the
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award criteria provided in the Department of Defense
Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, section
216.404-2
.
Evaluation criteria chosen should focus on "results"
rather than "process." The Government is interested in the
results rather than the contractor's effort. They should also
focus on those few elements of the contract that are
fundamental to the success of the contract. Meaningless,
confusing or numerous elements will dilute contractor's
motivation. On the other hand, too few elements will fail to
adequately measure total contractor performance. [Ref. 17 :p.
46]
D. MEASURING PERFORMANCE, GRADING PERFORMANCE, AND ASSIGNING
RELATIVE WEIGHTS TO FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND EVALUATION
CRITERIA
After developing the functional areas and evaluation
criteria, standards for measurement should be established and
applied to each evaluation factor. The evaluation standard
should allow two separate evaluators or monitors to
subjectively recommend nearly the same performance score on
any given set of performance reports. The example in Appendix
B portrays some sample measurement standards.
The most common system of standards is the numerical or
adjectival rating system. This explains performance quality
adjectives and indexes them to a numerical rating. The
33
following is an example of adjectival ratings, numerical
ratings and their rating criteria from the Handbook for CPAF
Contracts, written by the U.S. Army Forces Command. They are










91-100 Performance is excellent in all
significant aspects. There are no
areas of less than very good
performance (100) or they are few
and relatively unimportant in nature
(91) . Performance is significantly
better than would be expected of an
average qualified contractor.
Contractor initiative is evident by
quality and efficiency achieved.
Areas in need of improvement are few
and minor.
81 - 90 Performance is better than that
which would be expected of an
average qualified contractor. There
are no areas of less than good
performance (90) or they are few and
relatively unimportant (81)
.
71 - 80 Performance is equivalent to that
expected of an average qualified
contractor. The minimum contract
requirements are met (80) or areas
of less than good performance are
relatively offset by areas of very
good performance (71)
.
61 - 70 Performance is less than that
expected of an average qualified
contractor. There are significant
areas where performance is marginal,
but they are partially offset by
areas of very good performance (70)
or many deficiencies exist with few
or no offsetting areas of good or
very good performance (61)
.
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ADJECTIVE NUMERICAL RATING DESCRIPTION
RATING RATING
Submarginal - 60 Performance is substantially less
than expected of an average
qualified contractor. Performance
is characterized by major
deficiencies with few or no
offsetting areas of very good




The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that cost-
plus -award- fee contracts be evaluated at stated intervals
during performance. Thus, the contractor will periodically be
informed of the quality of the performance and the areas were
improvement is expected [Ref. l:p. 16-404.2 (b) (3)] . There is
no set requirement for the actual evaluation intervals.
However, they should be timely to adequately incentivize
contractors (e.g. monthly). Shorter evaluation periods
increase the administrative burden. This cost should be
weighed against more timely feedback. In any case , the
evaluation period should not be excessive. An evaluation
period of four to six months should be adequate. Some have
suggested the most appropriate method may be one which can
give instantaneous feedback to the contractor. The more
timely the feedback, the more effective the contractor will be
in adjusting his performance [Ref. 18:p. 38].
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F. TOTAL AWARD FEE POOL AVAILABLE FOR EACH EVALUATION PERIOD
Contracting activities are required to have the total
award fee pool budgeted each period. If the award fee is not
available for payment, it can act as a strong disincentive.
Raymond G. Hunt [Ref . 19] , interviewing Air Force contractors,
found that the contractors perceived that some commands use
the award fee pool as a discretionary budget tool. They felt
that the agency was giving them low award fees to save money
or divert it to other uses. They did not feel the low awards
were related to poor performance. These contractor's
perception was "take what you can get." [Ref. 19 :p. 88] The
award fee was not an incentive.
6. ASSIGNING TEE AWARD FEE DETERMINING OFFICIAL
The Award Fee Determining Official (ADO) or Fee
Determination Official (FDO) will be an individual who is
higher organizationally than the people directly involved in
performing the evaluation [Ref. 16:p. 24]. The Fee
Determining Official ideally maintains a neutral position by
being removed from observing the daily performance. This
helps ensure a fair fee determination based on the
recommendation of the Performance Evaluation Board [Ref. 20 :p.
5] . In a major contract, the FDO or ADO would be at the
management level of the procuring activity, usually the
project manager. In smaller contracts this function is
performed by the contracting officer [Ref. 18 :p. 32]
.
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H. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The organizational structure consists of three main
elements within the contracting agency: Government monitors or
evaluators, Performance Evaluation Board (PEB) and the Award
Fee Determining Official.
The first level in the structure is the Government
monitors who evaluate contractor performance during the
reporting period. The personnel who usually perform this task
are technical and professional experts who are monitoring the
contractor's performance on a regular basis. This may be
performed by on-site representatives, such as Contracting





Administrative Contracting Officers, Defense
Contract Management Command personnel and Defense Contract
Audit Agency Auditors. They should know the contract
requirements, evaluation criteria and technical criteria [Ref
.
18 :p. 31]. Because technical and professional knowledge are
required, personnel with expertise are usually chosen to
monitor those areas. Their findings and comments are
consolidated into periodic reports submitted to the Award Fee
Performance Evaluation Board.
The next level in the structure is the Performance
Evaluation Board. The Department of Defense Supplement to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation states that:
consideration may be given to constituting a board to
evaluate the contractor's performance and determine the
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amount of the award fee or recommend an amount to the
contracting officer [Ref. 9:p. 216 . 404 (b) (S- 72) (i) ]
.
The Performance Evaluation Board subjectively evaluates all
information presented to them in a manner that is fair and
equitable to both the Government and the contractor [Ref.
20:p. 53]. After reviewing the monitors' and contractor's
input, they will determine an overall performance grade based
on the evaluation criteria. The recommendation is forwarded
to the Award Fee Determining Official. In small less complex
procurements, the Performance Evaluation Board may be
excluded. [Ref. 18:p. 31]
The last level in the structure is the Award Fee
Determining Official or Fee Determination Official. The Fee
Determination Official, as the name states, makes the actual
award fee determination. It is based on inputs from the
monitors, the contractor and the Performance Evaluation Board.
The Fee Determination Official is not bound by the
recommendations of the Performance Evaluation Board. When the
initial determination is made, the Fee Determination Official
forwards a letter to the contractor stating the award fee
amount, strengths, weaknesses and areas that need improvement.
The contractor may refute this initial determination by
providing evidence or support to the Fee Determination
Official. Once the final award fee determination is made, the
decision is final and not subject to the disputes clause [Ref.
l:p. 16.404-2 (a) ]
.
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I. SPECIFIC METHODOLOGY USED IN EVALUATING PERFORMANCE AND
DETERMINING AWARD FEE TO BE PAID
This methodology ties together some of the areas
previously discussed, such as the award fee pool, functional
areas to be evaluated, criteria, and measurement processes.
This methodology converts actual overall performance weighted
ratings into award fee payments. This recommended fee is a
specific dollar amount derived by a mathematical process using
weights and scores. It may appear to be very objective.
However, the initial score is derived from subjective rating
criteria and adjectival ratings (excellent, good, marginal,
etc.) [Ref . 16 :p. 19] . An award fee conversion chart is the
method most commonly used to convert weighted performance
scores to dollar amounts, as shown in Appendix C. It should
be noted that a score of 60, which on the adjectival rating
scale was a submarginal grade, corresponds to a award of $0.
This is consistent with the idea of that the award fee is for
performance above a minimum acceptable level.
J. CONTRACTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE AWARD FEE DETERMINATION
PROCESS
The Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation states that consideration may be given
"to afford the contractor an opportunity to present matters on
his own behalf" [Ref. 9:p. 216 . 404-2 (b) (S-72) (i) ] . This can
be accomplished by allowing the contractor to present
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supporting evidence to the Performance Evaluation Board. Such
evidence may include: specific examples of what they did to
merit a favorable evaluation in each performance area;
discussion of internal problems and corrective action taken;
trend information on several periods of performance; self
evaluation of performance; and answers to any questions
potentially raised by the Performance Evaluation Board.
Although this is not required, it does create the image that
the award fee determination process is fair and equitable.
[Ref. 20:p. 54]
K. PAYMENT INTERVALS
These normally correspond with the evaluation period and
are based on the type of contract . Payments that do not
correspond with the evaluation period may dilute the
contractor's incentive to improve performance.
L. REPORTING AND RECORD KEEPING PROCEDURES
These will specify the exact procedures that will be
followed to insure that all personnel, Government and
contractor, understand and are informed of their
responsibilities. These will generally depend on the




The final plan should be equitable, realistic, and provide
timely performance reviews and assessments. The contractor
will only be motivated if he feels that the award fee is
attainable and the process is fair. The award fee plan must
also clearly communicate what will be evaluated and the means
by which performance will be measured. [Ref. 16 :p. 7]
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VI. OPTIMAL AWARD FEE MODEL
A. REQUIREMENT FOR ESTABLISHING THE AWARD FEE POOL
The unique incentive tool of an award fee contract is the
ability to reward the contractor for above average
performance. This award pool consists of two parts: the base
fee and the award fee.
The base fee is a fixed fee established at the beginning
of the contract. It is incrementally paid to the contractor
regardless of their performance.
The award fee portion of the total award pool is the
amount established at the onset of the contract that is used
to reward the contractor. The award fee amount must be
sufficient to motivate the contractor to attain excellent
performance. The question arises, what is sufficient?
Acquisition regulations and guidelines do provide some
guidance for determining the award fee amount. The FAR simply
states that the award amount should be sufficient to provide
"motivation for excellence in such areas as quality,
timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective
management." [Ref. l:p. 16.4 04-2].
The Department of Energy [Ref. 3] recommends determining
the award fee amount jointly with the base fee to establish an
amount that is most likely to motivate the contractor to
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attain expressed performance levels. This guideline also
recommends that the combined base fee and award fee should not
normally exceed 50 percent of the maximum allowable CPFF fee
or a fee developed using the weighted guidelines method. [Ref
.
3:p. 2-3D3]
The weighted guidelines method is a structured technique
that the Government uses to insure that the relative value of
appropriate profit factors are considered in establishing a
profit objective and negotiating the contract. Appropriate
profit factors include contractor's effort, contractor's cost
risk, facilities investment, and special factors such as
productivity, independent development, etc. [Ref. 7:p. B-10]
Using weighted guidelines or an alternate structured
approach to determine the award fee pool is prohibited by the
Department of Defense. The DFARS states that the contracting
officer in developing a fee objective for a CPAF contract
shall not use the weighted guidelines method or alternate
structured approach and shall not complete a DD form 1547
(record of weighted guidelines method application) [Ref. 9:p.
215.974] . The contracting officer is referred back to the FAR
guidance for subjectively determining an amount sufficient to
motivate the contractor.
B. USE OF ECONOMIC MODELING
An economic model may help the contracting officer
determine an optimal award fee amount that will sufficiently
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motivate the contractor. As in all procurements, the
Government is concerned with cost minimization and the
contractor with profit maximization. An economic model could
be used to determine an efficient allocation of both the
Government's and contractor's resources.
Economic Efficiency, or Pareto efficiency as it is
sometimes called, is concerned with determining both the
Government's and the contractor's well being and the efficient
allocation of their resources. If an award fee pool is too
small, the contractor will not be sufficiently motivated and
performance will lower than the Government's expectations. If
the award fee pool is too large the contractor may meet all
performance expectations, but the Government is foregoing
budget dollars that could be used for other programs. The
goal of the economic model is to determine the optimal award
fee amount. This amount will sufficiently motivate the
contractor and use Government resources efficiently.
Government resources include both budgeted dollars and the
personnel involved in monitoring contractor performance.
C. OPTIMAL AWARD FEE MODEL
The model developed in this chapter focuses on two
factors. The first factor is the contractor's effort. Since
the Government can not control the contractor's effort, it
wants the contractor to expend maximum effort. Presumably the
harder the contractor works, the higher the chance of
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favorable contract performance. This factor measures the
complexity of the work and the resources required of the
prospective contractor.
The second factor in this model is the expected results of
the contractor's performance. The contractor's performance
can vary from excellent to unacceptable. To simplify the
model, it focuses on two desired results: very good
performance and good performance.
Using these two factors, the contracting officer will
evaluate the probability of the contractor expending
extraordinary effort. This would result in very good
performance with a probability pH. The contracting officer
will also evaluate the probability of the contractor expending
adequate effort. This would result in very good performance
with a probability of pL. The preceding determination is
summarized in TABLE 1.
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PH 1 - pH
pL 1 - pL
1. Expected Government Gain
The Government desires to maximize the gain it
receives from this contract. The Government's gain represents
the amount that it benefits from the item that exceeds the
Government's payment (costs plus net revenue) to the
contractor, administrative costs, and opportunity cost of
foregoing the use of budgeted dollars to other projects. The
benefit is represented by BV for Very Good Performance and BG
for Good performance. The Government gain (GG) is given by
GG = Maximize {GH,GL)
where :GH = (BV-Z) -pH + (BG-Y) • (1-ptf)
GL = (BV-Z) -pL + (BG-Y) • (1-pL)
2. Contractor Optimization
To determine the optimal award fee, the contractor's
utility function must be evaluated. This utility function has
three components. The first component (A) is the nonmonetary
benefit the contractor receives from the contract. This
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benefit may be improving the contractor's competitive position
in the commercial marketplace, enhancing the contractor's
capability and expertise, expected follow-on production
contracts, or other DOD, Government agency, or foreign
military sales (FMS) . The second component (R) represents the
contractor's net revenue upon completing the contract. The
third component (E) represents the firm's opportunity cost of
undertaking a Government contract. It is the value of the
activities a firm must forego in order to undertake the
Government contract.
Zn and Yn denote the net revenue for the contractor
such that Zn = Z - C and Yn = Y - C. C denotes the expected
cost of production, including the base fee, which the
contractor receives regardless of actual performance.
U = U(A,R,E) = A + R b - dE
A>0 , 0<jb<l, dal
If E = 2:
UH = U{A,R,2) = pH(A+Zn b-2d) + (1-pH) (A+Yn b-2d)
UH = ApH+Zn bpH-2dpH+A+Yn b-2d-ApH-Yn bpH-2dpH
UH = Zn bpH-Yn bpH+A-2d+Yn b
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If E = 1
UL = U(A,R,1) = pL(A+Zn b -ld) + (1-pL) (A + Yn b-ld)
UL = ApL+Zn bpL-dpL+A+Yn b-d-ApL-Yn bpL+dpL
UL = Zn bpL-Yn bpL+A-d+Yn b
Then we want to have
UH 2 UL
Substituting for UH and UL
Zn bpH-Yn bpH+A-2d+Yn b s Zn bpL-Yn bpL+A-d+Yn b
Zn bpH-Zn bpL 2 Yn bpH-Yn bpL+d
Zn b {pH-pL) s Yn b {pH-pL)+d








3 . Optimal Government Payment
If the Government wants the contractor to expend high
effort, then GH > GL. The Government wants to find (Z,Y) that
achieves this objective while minimizing the expected
Government payment (EGP) . In the extraordinary effort case
the Government will pay Z = Zn + C. In the adequate effort
case, the Government will pay Y = Yn + C. If the contractor
expends extraordinary effort:
EGP = pH-Z + (1-ptf) • Y
To minimize its costs the Government will select a
payment scheme where Yn = . If the payment scheme is set to
elicit extraordinary effort:
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Substituting these values for Zn and Yn into the expressions
for Z and Y: _
Y = C + Yn
Y = C and
Z = C + Zn
1
Z = C + ( - ) ^pH - pL






This illustration shows that the optimal award fee amount
in this model increases with the marginal cost of effort and
decreases as the probability of a favorable outcome increases.
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1. Reasonable Expectation of Very Good Performance
In the first scenario, the contracting officer
determines the probability of performance outcomes as
illustrated in TABLE 2 below.













To simplify the illustrations the following variables







The preceding probabilities and variables yield the following
results
:
pH pL BV BG C
.67 .33 130 110 100
Optimal Award Fee Amount (Zn) =9
Expected Government Payment (High Effort) = 106
Government Gain (High Effort) =17.33
Expected Government Payment (Low Effort) = 101
Government Gain (Low Effort) = 15.67
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In this scenario the Government gain from the high
effort contract is greater than that gain expected from the
low effort contract. The low effort contract is what the
Government would expect if they chose not to utilize the award
fee contract and were satisfied with the performance resulting
from not incentivizing the contractor's effort. This low
effort contract would be similar to utilizing a Cost-Plus-
Fixed- Fee (CPFF) contract in which the contractor's profit or
fee is fixed regardless of actual contract performance. In
the illustration this payment is 101. This is the cost of
100, which includes the opportunity cost of foregone
investments, and a fixed profit of 1.
2 . High Expectation of Very Good Performance Scenario
In this scenario, the contracting officer determines
there is a high probability of very good performance
illustrated in TABLE 3.













The preceding probabilities yield the following
results
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PH pL BV BG C
.95 .50 130 110 100
Optimal Award Fee Amount (Zn) = 4.94
Expected Government Payment (High Effort) = 104.69
Government Gain (High Effort) = 24.31
Expected Government Payment (Low Effort) = 101
Government Gain (Low Effort) = 19.00
In this scenario the award fee has decreased from 9 to 4.94.
Since the expectation of the contractor's performance has
increased, the amount required to motivate him to achieve this
level of performance has decreased.
3 . Very Low Expectation of Very Good Performance
In this scenario, the contracting officer determines
that there is a very low expectation of very good performance,
as illustrated in TABLE 4.













The preceding probabilities yield the following
results
pH pL BV BG C
.33 .25 130 110 100
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Optimal Award Fee Amount (Zn) = 144
Expected Government Payment (High Effort) = 148
Government Gain (High Effort) - -31.33
Expected Government Payment (Low Effort) = 101
Government Gain (Low Effort) = 14.00
This scenario results in an optimal award fee amount of 144.
This is extremely large compared to the contract cost. This
is expected since the probability of very good performance is
so low. To motivate the contractor to extraordinary effort
requires a large incentive. However, the benefit is -31.44 as
compared to 14 for the CPFF contract. In this scenario, the
Government would be better off not using an award fee
contract. The probability of very good performance does not
merit the extra cost.
4. Optimal Award Fee compared to levels of pH and pL
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the
probability of very good performance and the optimal award
fee. As the probability of very good performance increases
the optimal award fee decreases.
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Figure 1: Optimal Award Fees
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5. Expected Government Gains compared to the level of pH
Figures 2, 3 and 4 illustrate the expected Government
gain as the probability of pH increases. The intersection of
GG (high) and GG (low) is that point where it becomes
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Figure 3: Expected Government Gain at pL = .33
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Figure 4: Expected Government Gain at pL = .50
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E. SUMMARY
Using an economic model similar to the one proposed here
can help the contracting officer determine the optimal award
fee that will appropriately incentivize the contractor.
Applying this model will also help determine if the CPAF
contract is appropriate for the proposed acquisition, based on
the model's parameters.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions apply to this research effort.
1. Properly administering award fee contracts is an
excellent tool for incentivizing contractors to improve
performance and quality, because of the breadth of performance
evaluation reports and monitoring in award fee contracts.
This is a benefit that is not inherent in other contract types
used in Government procurement
.
The award fee process fails to adequately motivate
performance when areas of the award fee plan are
inappropriately applied. Most common is inadequate Government
monitoring. Significant expertise and effort are required to
successfully administer award fee contracts.
Contractor motivation is also reduced when performance
evaluation criteria are written so that excellent performance
is unachievable. The top level of performance should be
attainable and represent significantly better than average
performance by a qualified contractor. Excellent performance
should not translate to perfect performance.
2. Contracting personnel are aware of CPAF contracting,
but the guidance on use, application, and structure of FPAF
contracting is minimal to nonexistent. The advantage of using
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award fee contracts should not be restricted only to cost-
reimbursement contracts. Many applications exist in fixed-
price contracts where award fee provisions would maximize the
Government's value.
The DFARS specifies the application and structure of FPAF
contracts. However, the current FAR language considers a FPAF
contract as a hybrid contract. Language regarding these
contract types is subject to interpretation. Purchasing,
contracting, and acquisition textbooks and guidelines
generally do not specify FPAF contracts when considering
contract type selection. These omissions and ambiguities
inhibit further use of award fee provisions in fixed-price
contracts
.
3. The administrative burden is the largest barrier in
expanding the use of award fee contracts. When determining
the appropriate contract type for a particular acquisition,
and whether the award fee can be applied, administrative
burden is one of the largest factors. This administrative
burden includes increased performance monitoring, availability
of technical experts for performance monitoring, training of
inexperienced users and convening award fee determination
boards
.
The cost of the administrative burden problem is also very
difficult to objectively quantify so it can be compared to the
benefit derived by an award fee contract. This results in a
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more subjective than objective determination of appropriate
contract type.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Expand the awareness of FPAF contracts at the Navy
Field Contracting Activity level
Many benefits can be derived from using award fee
provisions with fixed-price contracts, when appropriate. All
contracting personnel should be made aware of its use and
application through training and policy guidance. Current FAR
guidance and other directives are ambiguous and vague
concerning FPAF contracts.
2 . Develop Award Fee Guidebook for use by requiring
activities
Developing an Award Fee Guidebook that discusses both
pre -award and post -award factors would help enhance the
contracting process and reduce the administrative burden. The
guidebook should illustrate the benefits derived from award
fee contracts and lead to better enthusiasm and less
apprehension from requiring activities.
3 . Change the FAR to recognize the FPAF contract as a
specific contract type
The lack of specific FAR language concerning FPAF
contracts inhibits greater utilization. Currently, using an
award fee provision with a fixed-price type contract is
classified as a hybrid contract type. The FAR language is
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subject to interpretation in using this contract. Some
contracting personnel believe that it is allowed since it
would be in the Government's interest to use this contract.
Others believe that it should not be used without deviation
approval since it is not specified as an authorized contract
type.
The DFARS removes this confusion for the Department of
Defense by including specific language which allows FPAF
contracts with the chief of contracting approval. This type
of recognition would enhance FPAF contracts and make their use
more acceptable.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the key elements and barriers in using of
award fee contracts at the Navy Field Contracting
Activity level and how can these barriers be overcome
to facilitate the proper use of award fee contracts?
The key element and barrier in using award fee
contracts is administrative burden. If an acquisition meets
all other criteria (e.g. subjective performance criteria,
large dollar value, risk assessment, etc...), an award fee
contract may still be inappropriate because the contracting
activity estimates that the large administrative burden would
exceed the expected benefit.
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2.
What is the award fee concept?
The award fee concept is an unique incentive structure
which allows the Government to reward the contractor based on
subjective, after the fact evaluation of the contractor's
performance
.
The reward is increased if the contractor's
performance is above an average level and no reward may be
given if performance is below a minimal acceptable performance
level
.
3. What are the uses of Cost -Plus -Award- Fee and Fixed-
Price -Award- Fee contracts?
Cost-plus-award- fee contracts have been successfully
used in various contracts for research and development,
engineering and technical services, production and complex
service contracts. These uses have one thing in common. They
all contain some subjective performance criteria, such as
quality, reliability, maintainability, schedule, cost control
and service provided.
Fixed-price-award- fee contracts can be used in
construction, base operating services, custodial services and
routine or predictable service contracts.
Award fee provisions may also be used with other
contract types when appropriate conditions exist so that they
are in the Government's interest. A common example of this is
using award fee provisions with fixed-price incentive (firm
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target) (FPIF) contracts. The objective cost incentives are
predetermined and negotiated in the contract and award
provisions are made to reward the contractor in subjective
performance areas of quality, reliability, etc....
4 . When should an award fee contract be used?
The important criteria that must be met when using
award fee contracts is that subjective evaluation criteria
must be used. If objective criteria can be developed, another
contract type will be more appropriate. If objective
evaluation criteria can not be developed, award fee contracts
are appropriate.
If possible, the criteria should be quantifiable, even
though they are subjective. Quantifiable standards are those
that are measured against well defined, unambiguous or
tangible standards. The criteria should be well written so
that two separate evaluators can arrive at the same
performance grade when monitoring contractor performance.
5. What are the barriers to using award fee contracts?
The most common barrier is that the requiring activity
is unwilling or incapable of assuming the administrative
burden associated with award fee contracts. The benefits of
award fee contracting will be mitigated if any of the
following occur:
1. Lack of sincere evaluation or performance monitoring.
2. Lack of evaluation checklists, work sheets, or
performance standards.
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3. Lack of performance monitoring plan.
4
.
Personal bias of evaluators
.
5. Lack of technically competent evaluators.
6. Ineffective communication between evaluators and the
contractor.
6 . How might these impediments or barriers be reduced or
eliminated?
The barriers can be reduced by developing a
comprehensive award fee guide that could be used by the
contract procurement, contract administration and requiring
activity. Many guidebooks developed by other activities can
be used as a reference. The guidebook should also illustrate
the benefits of using award fee contracts as compared to other
contract types. This would help in generating more responses
from activities preferring award fee contracts.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
(1) Consider using award fee contracts as a mechanism for
the Government and contractors to embody the current programs
of Total Quality Management (TQM) , Total Quality Leadership
(TQL)
, and Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI)
.
(2) Expand the analysis of the proposed economic model
for determining the optimal award fee.
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Award Fee Determining Official
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
Cost - plus - award- fee
Cost-plus- fixed- fee
Cost-plus- incentive- fee





















Fixed-price incentive (firm target)
Fixed-price incentive (successive targets)
Fixed-price with redetermination
Government -owned- contractor- operated






APPENDIX B - SAMPLE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT
Sample Performance Evaluation Report Criteria
and
Contractor Performance Evaluation Report
[Source: DFARS 216.4-4]
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100 100.00 79 52.5
99 98.0 78 50.0
98 96.0 77 47.0
97 94.0 76 44.0
96 92.0 75 41.0
95 90.0 74 38.0
94 88.0 73 35.0
93 86.0 72 32.0
92 84.0 71 29.0
91 82.0 70 26.0
90 80.0 69 22.0
89 77.5 68 20.0
88 75.0 67 18.0
87 72.5 66 16.0
86 70.0 65 14.0
85 67.5 64 12.0
84 65.0 63 10.0
83 62.5 62 8.0
82 60.0 61 4.0
81 57.5 60 0.0
80 55.0
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APPENDIX D - INTERVIEW/SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What contract types are you presently administering?
a. fixed types:
b. cost types:




3. What areas are you contracting for? (i.e services,
repairs, maintenance, etc. ..
)
4. What is the most important criteria for contract selection
type?





- # of offerors
5. What role does the requiring activity play in contract
type selection?
6. What areas are you applying award fee contracts to?
7. What areas do you consider are suitable/ appropriate for
an award fee contract?
8. What influences most the use of an award fee contract?
- customer preference
- item/service being procured




9. What most influences not using award fee contracts?
- customer preference
- dollar amount
- availability of performance monitors
- item/service being performed
- availability of adequate performance work statements
- administrative burden (pre-award)
- contractor willingness
72
10. What are the advantages of using award fee contracts?
11. What are the disadvantages of using award fee contracts?
12. What is the "administrative burden" in an award fee
contract?
13 . Is there written guidance available in administering award
fee contracts?
14. What areas need to be changed in the structure of award
fees to make them easier to administer?
15. Is there a risk in awarding an award fee contract? (Risk
in that other contract types will accomplish same goals
without government involvement)
16. Have you used fixed price award fee (FPAF) or familiar
with any agency that has?
17. Do you think that if fixed price award fee contracts were
used that it should be structured similarly or differently
from CPAF?
18. What types of contracts are being applied to areas that
could utilize a FPAF contract?
19. Who should develop work statements?
-requiring activity
-contract specialists
20. Is it possible to boiler plate the work statements that
will be utilized in a Award Fee contract?
21. Is there experience available in writing work statements?
22. Is there written guidance available in writing work
statements?
23. Is the adequacy of work statements required for a Award
Fee contract the same or different versus other types of
contracts?
- Fixed vs. Cost
- Sole source vs. competitive
24. Are requiring activities providing contract oversight
(COTR, IQUE) that could be used in Award Fee performance
monitoring?
25. Can an Award Fee contract insure Quality better than other
types of contracts?
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26. What degree of communication with the contractor does
award fee contract provide as compared to other types of
contracts?
27. Are cost reimbursement and FPI contracts less costly to
administer?
28. In instances of Cost type contracts
- are the functions routine or non routine?
- could a firm fixed price contract be used for the same
function?
could a statement of work for a firm fixed price
contract vs written for this function?
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